IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
LEBON B. WALKER and *
PATRICIA LEE WALKER *
Plaintiffs
*
v.
* Civil Action No. DKC-95-1629
DENNIS COX, et al., *
Defendants
*
MEMORANDUM
The Plaintiffs in this case, Lebon Bruce Walker
and Patricia Lee Walker were scheduled to stand trial in Montgomery County
on January 18, 1993. When they failed to appear, a chain of events
began that eventually resulted in their extradition from Africa,
conviction on various charges, and the present litigation.
After they were indicted in 1992 on theft charges,
the Walkers were released on bail of $250,000.00 posted by the London Bail
Bonding Co.
On December 26, 1992, Mrs. Walker purchased
a new, 1992 Toyota Four Runner. She made a down payment of $3,500.00
and financed the balance of $25,782.00 through the dealer. Mrs. Walker
agreed to make monthly payments of $566.38 beginning on February 9, 1993.
(Paper No. 21, Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Dennis Cox). Mrs. Walker
never made any payments. (Paper No. 68, Exhibit 1, p. 30).
A condition of Mrs. Walker’s release was that
she remain on
electronic monitoring. On January 10, 1993, her assigned
caseworker was unable to contact her. As a result an investigator
was sent to her home and found the monitoring bracelet and not much else.
On their scheduled trial date the Walkers failed to appear. Lebon
Bruce Walker and Patricia Annette Lee v. State, Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, Sept, Term 1994 No, 258 (October 25, 1994) - (Paper No. 21, Attachment).
The trial was conducted in absentia.
In January 1993, Perry London, the owner of
London Bail Bonding hired a private investigator, Dennis Cox, to locate
the Walkers. (Paper No. 68, Exhibit 1 at 15-16). Later Mr.
Cox spoke with Toyota and began looking for the Four Runner to repossess
it on their behalf. (Id. at 17).
The Walkers had intended to ship the Four Runner,
presumably
to Africa, but were unable to do so as originally planned because
the shipping company wanted proof of a paid title. (Paper
No. 68, Supplemental Affidavit of Lebon Bruce Walker, ¶¶ 7 and
8). In early April 1993, Mr. Walker purchased a large shipping container
using the name Larry Platt. (Id., Exhibits A and B). The Four Runner
was placed in this container and a metal bar welded across the door.
(Id. ¶5).
On or around June 9, 1993 Mr. Cox learned of
the existence of
the shipping container. (Id., Exhibit 1 at 16). He
obtained a
“hold harmless” agreement from Toyota. (Paper No. 41, Exhibit1).
He went to the company where the container was located. Someone else
removed the bar, and Mr. Cox entered the container. Inside was the
Four Runner. Inside the Four Runner were certain articles including
clothing, papers, office equipment, etc. Mr. Cox identified the Four
Runner as the vehicle he was seeking through its appearance and the vehicle
identification number. He went through the items in the car.
He removed a diary that he later turned over to the Montgomery County Sheriff?s
Department. The Four Runner and its other contents were turned over
to Toyota. (Paper No. 68, Exhibit 1 at 20-22).
Eventually the Walkers were located in Africa
and extradited
to the United States. They were convicted of jumping bail.
Lebon Bruce Walker and Patricia Annette Lee, Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, Sept. Term 1994, No. 258 (October 25, 1994).
On June 1, 1995, the Walkers filed suit in this
Court alleging that Mr. Cox’s actions in entering the container, repossessing
the Four Runner, removing the diary, etc. violated their Constitutional
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They assert that
at the time these acts were committed Mr. Cox was acting as the agent of
Perry London and London Bail Bonding, and that Mr. London and his company
had failed to properly train Mr. Cox. Named as Defendants are Dennis
Cox; his company, Harford Bureau of Investigations; Perry London; and his
company, London Bail Bonding (Paper No. 1).
* * *
Defendants argue that the Walkers’ claims are
barred because
they were litigated in the criminal proceedings against the
Walkers. (Paper No. 21 at 13-14). At their criminal
trial on
charges of bail jumping the Walkers filed a motion to suppress
the diary that Mr. Cox found in the Four Runner. This motion was
denied. (See Paper No. 36, attached transcript of suppression
hearing). They again raised the issue on appeal. The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion stating:
“We hold that Dennis Cox was not a State agent
and that the
Fourth Amendment was not applicable to him.” Lebon Bruce
Walker
and Annette Patricia Lee v. State, Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, Sept. Term. 1994, No 258 at 5 (October 25, 1994).
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to
civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Federal courts are required to
give state court judgments the same preclusive effect to which they are
entitled under state law. Migra v. Warren City School District
Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); 20 U.S.C. § 1738.
Under Maryland law in order for collateral estoppel
to apply
there must be privity of the parties; actual litigation of an issue
of law or fact; the determination must be essential to the
judgment; and the determination must be appealable. Cassidy
v.
Board of Education, 316 Md. 50, 62, 557 A.2d 227, 233 (1989).
Maryland courts have indicated a willingness to apply this doctrine
to bar relitigation of issues decided at suppression hearings if the criminal
trial ended in a final judgment. Cook v, State, 281 Md. 665,
669, 381 A.2d 671, 673, cert. denied, 439 U. S. 839 (1978).
While the Defendants in this case were not,
strictly speaking, parties to the Walkers' criminal trial, the fact that
Mr. Cox was the primary witness at the suppression hearing places them
in a sufficient position of privity with the State. The question
of whether the Walkers' Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the entry
into the container and the search of the Four Runner was essential to the
suppression ruling. The trial ended in a final judgment of conviction,
which was appealed and affirmed. Under these circumstances the Walkers
are collaterally estopped from relitigating the validity of the search
in this Court in the form of a civil rights action.
Alternatively, the Court finds that the Walkers
did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Four Runner or the items
stored in it. When Mrs. Walker bought the Four Runner she signed
a contract that provided in part:
If you default under this contract,
the Creditor can take the vehicle
from you (repossession). To take
the vehicle the Creditor can enter
your property, or the property where
it is stored so long as it is done
peacefully or in accordance with
legal process. If there is any
personal property in the vehicle
such as clothing, the Creditor can
store it for you.
(Paper No. 21, Exhibit 1). By signing this agreement and then
failing to make any payments. Mrs. Walker relinquished any
expectation of privacy that normally might exist in a motor
vehicle and its contents. (See United States v. Poulson,
41 F.3d
1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1994) (no expectation of privacy in contents
of storage locker after failing to pay rent); United States
v.
Huffhines, 967 F.3d 314, 318 (9th Cir. 1992) (no expectation
of
privacy in items left in hotel room that was repossessed after
expiration of rental period). Once Mr. Cox repossessed the
Four
Runner on behalf of Toyota his search of the vehicle, even if
performed in his capacity as a bail bondsman, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Weiss, 11 M.J.
C51 A.F.C.M.R.
1981).
The Walkers allege two possible bases for liability
on the
part of Perry London and London Bail Bonding: first, that they
failed to adequately train Mr. Cox; and second, that they are
liable for his acts because he was acting as their agent.
Even if the Walkers had a potentially viable claim against Mr. Cox, there
is no basis for liability by Mr. London or London Bail Bonding. Mr.
Cox is a former police officer and licensed private detective. (Paper
No. 68, Exhibit 2 at 4, 28-29). There is no better training that
Mr, London could have provided short of sending Mr. Cox to law school.
While the Walkers are correct that Mr. Cox was, in some respects, an agent
of Mr. London and London Bail Bonding, that is not a basis for liability
in a § 1983 action. Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services,
436 U. S. 658, 691 (1978).
Although the Walkers make a due process claim,
it is difficult to determine what additional process could be provided.
They litigated their Fourth Amendment claim at their criminal trial and
on appeal. Their assertion that the Four Runner should not have been
repossessed until a writ of replevin was issued is without merit.
See Md. Comm. Code Ann., §12-1021. By entering into the contract to
buy the vehicle, Mrs. Walker accepted the risk that the vehicle would be
repossessed if she did not make payments. Although the Walkers complain
that they did not receive proper notice of the repossession, this is their
fault for not notifying Toyota of their new address as was required by
the sales contract. Nor have the Walkers shown that they do not have
adequate post-deprivation remedies in the Maryland courts by way of a civil
action for damages or replevin.
No additional facts have been alleged by the
Walkers in
support of their claim that they were denied equal protection,
so
for the reasons stated in the Court's February 1, 1996 Memorandum,
these allegations fail to state a constitutional claim. (See Paper No.
44 at 4).
The Walkers also raise pendent state law claims.
The Court
declines to exercise jurisdiction over these claims. See
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.
S. 715, 726 (1966).
Deborah K. Chasanow
United States District Judge
February 19, 1997
